Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Kawase, Yasushi, Suksompong, Warut, Sumita, Hanna, Yokoi, Yu
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Kawase, Yasushi
Suksompong, Warut
Sumita, Hanna
Yokoi, Yu
author_facet Kawase, Yasushi
Suksompong, Warut
Sumita, Hanna
Yokoi, Yu
contents In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in each agent envying another agent with high probability. To address this, we introduce decomposition envy-freeness (Dec-EF), which is a property of a decomposition rather than of an assignment matrix. We show that an SD-EF assignment matrix always admits a Dec-EF decomposition when there are at most three agents or the agents have at most two distinct preferences.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_16973
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
Kawase, Yasushi
Suksompong, Warut
Sumita, Hanna
Yokoi, Yu
Theoretical Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in each agent envying another agent with high probability. To address this, we introduce decomposition envy-freeness (Dec-EF), which is a property of a decomposition rather than of an assignment matrix. We show that an SD-EF assignment matrix always admits a Dec-EF decomposition when there are at most three agents or the agents have at most two distinct preferences.
title Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
topic Theoretical Economics
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.16973