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Optimal linear-payment auction design with aftermarket collaboration

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Wang, Dazhong, Wang, Ruqu, Xu, Xinyi
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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