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Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Guiñazú, Nadia, Juarez, Noelia, Manasero, Paola, Neme, Pablo, Oviedo, Jorge
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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