Security Risks of VOA-Induced Luminescence in Chip-Based quantum key distribution
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915945882058752 |
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| author | Li, Zijian Xu, Chenyu Hua, Xin Du, Yongqiang Liu, Xin Lin, Tao Xiao, Xi Wei, Kejin |
| author_facet | Li, Zijian Xu, Chenyu Hua, Xin Du, Yongqiang Liu, Xin Lin, Tao Xiao, Xi Wei, Kejin |
| contents | Integrated photonics is widely regarded as a key enabler for scalable quantum key distribution (QKD), offering compactness, stability, and compatibility with semiconductor fabrication. Despite rapid advances in chip-based QKD, the implementation security of integrated photonic components remains insufficiently understood. Here we present the first systematic study of an implementation-level security vulnerability associated with p-n junction-based variable optical attenuators (VOAs), a ubiquitous component in integrated QKD transmitters. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate that electrically biased p-n junction VOAs emit spontaneous luminescence. Using a single-photon-sensitive spectral measurement technique, we identify the emission wavelength to be centered around 1107 nm, well separated from the C-band quantum signals. This spectral separation gives rise to a previously unrecognized wavelength-resolved side channel, enabling potential wavelength-splitting attacks without directly disturbing the encoded quantum states. By incorporating the measured luminescence into a quantitative security analysis, we show that even extremely weak emission can lead to non-negligible information leakage. Our findings reveal a fundamental and previously overlooked security risk in photonic integrated QKD systems and highlight the necessity of security-aware device design for future integrated quantum communication technologies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_18422 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security Risks of VOA-Induced Luminescence in Chip-Based quantum key distribution Li, Zijian Xu, Chenyu Hua, Xin Du, Yongqiang Liu, Xin Lin, Tao Xiao, Xi Wei, Kejin Quantum Physics Optics Integrated photonics is widely regarded as a key enabler for scalable quantum key distribution (QKD), offering compactness, stability, and compatibility with semiconductor fabrication. Despite rapid advances in chip-based QKD, the implementation security of integrated photonic components remains insufficiently understood. Here we present the first systematic study of an implementation-level security vulnerability associated with p-n junction-based variable optical attenuators (VOAs), a ubiquitous component in integrated QKD transmitters. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate that electrically biased p-n junction VOAs emit spontaneous luminescence. Using a single-photon-sensitive spectral measurement technique, we identify the emission wavelength to be centered around 1107 nm, well separated from the C-band quantum signals. This spectral separation gives rise to a previously unrecognized wavelength-resolved side channel, enabling potential wavelength-splitting attacks without directly disturbing the encoded quantum states. By incorporating the measured luminescence into a quantitative security analysis, we show that even extremely weak emission can lead to non-negligible information leakage. Our findings reveal a fundamental and previously overlooked security risk in photonic integrated QKD systems and highlight the necessity of security-aware device design for future integrated quantum communication technologies. |
| title | Security Risks of VOA-Induced Luminescence in Chip-Based quantum key distribution |
| topic | Quantum Physics Optics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.18422 |