Towards Certified Malware Detection: Provable Guarantees Against Evasion Attacks
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866918461759815680 |
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| author | Giri, Nandakrishna A., Asmitha K. Nicolazzo, Serena Nocera, Antonino P, Vinod |
| author_facet | Giri, Nandakrishna A., Asmitha K. Nicolazzo, Serena Nocera, Antonino P, Vinod |
| contents | Machine learning-based static malware detectors remain vulnerable to adversarial evasion techniques, such as metamorphic engine mutations. To address this vulnerability, we propose a certifiably robust malware detection framework based on randomized smoothing through feature ablation and targeted noise injection. During evaluation, our system analyzes an executable by generating multiple ablated variants, classifies them by using a smoothed classifier, and identifies the final label based on the majority vote. By analyzing the top-class voting distribution and the Wilson score interval, we derive a formal certificate that guarantees robustness within a specific radius against feature-space perturbations. We evaluate our approach by comparing the performance of the base classifier and the smoothed classifier on both clean executables and ablated variants generated using PyMetaEngine. Our results demonstrate that the proposed smoothed classifier successfully provides certifiable robustness against metamorphic evasion attacks without requiring modifications to the underlying machine learning architecture. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_20495 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Towards Certified Malware Detection: Provable Guarantees Against Evasion Attacks Giri, Nandakrishna A., Asmitha K. Nicolazzo, Serena Nocera, Antonino P, Vinod Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Machine learning-based static malware detectors remain vulnerable to adversarial evasion techniques, such as metamorphic engine mutations. To address this vulnerability, we propose a certifiably robust malware detection framework based on randomized smoothing through feature ablation and targeted noise injection. During evaluation, our system analyzes an executable by generating multiple ablated variants, classifies them by using a smoothed classifier, and identifies the final label based on the majority vote. By analyzing the top-class voting distribution and the Wilson score interval, we derive a formal certificate that guarantees robustness within a specific radius against feature-space perturbations. We evaluate our approach by comparing the performance of the base classifier and the smoothed classifier on both clean executables and ablated variants generated using PyMetaEngine. Our results demonstrate that the proposed smoothed classifier successfully provides certifiable robustness against metamorphic evasion attacks without requiring modifications to the underlying machine learning architecture. |
| title | Towards Certified Malware Detection: Provable Guarantees Against Evasion Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20495 |