PVAC: A RowHammer Mitigation Architecture Exploiting Per-victim-row Counting

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Kim, Jumin, Baek, Seungmin, Nam, Hwayong, Wi, Minbok, Kim, Nam Sung, Ahn, Jung Ho
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Kim, Jumin
Baek, Seungmin
Nam, Hwayong
Wi, Minbok
Kim, Nam Sung
Ahn, Jung Ho
author_facet Kim, Jumin
Baek, Seungmin
Nam, Hwayong
Wi, Minbok
Kim, Nam Sung
Ahn, Jung Ho
contents As DRAM scaling exacerbates RowHammer, DDR5 introduces per-row activation counting (PRAC) to track aggressor activity. However, PRAC indiscriminately increments counters on every activation -- including benign refreshes -- while relying solely on explicit RFM operations for resets. Consequently, counters saturate even in an idle bank, triggering cascading mitigations and degrading performance. This vulnerability arises from a fundamental mismatch: PRAC tracks the aggressor but aims to protect the victim. We present Per-Victim-row hAmmered Counting (PVAC), a victim-based counting mechanism that aligns the counter semantics with the physical disturbance mechanism of RowHammer. PVAC increments the counters of victim rows, resets the activated row, and naturally bounds counter values under normal refresh. To enable efficient victim-based updates, PVAC employs a dedicated counter subarray (CSA) that performs all counter resets and increments concurrently with normal accesses, without timing overhead. We further devise an energy-efficient CSA layout that minimizes refresh-induced counter accesses. Through victim-based counting, PVAC supports higher hammering tolerance than PRAC while maintaining the same worst-case safety guarantee. Across benign workloads and adversarial attack patterns, PVAC avoids spurious Alerts, eliminates PRAC timing penalties, and achieves higher performance and lower energy consumption than prior PRAC-based defenses.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_20576
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle PVAC: A RowHammer Mitigation Architecture Exploiting Per-victim-row Counting
Kim, Jumin
Baek, Seungmin
Nam, Hwayong
Wi, Minbok
Kim, Nam Sung
Ahn, Jung Ho
Cryptography and Security
Hardware Architecture
As DRAM scaling exacerbates RowHammer, DDR5 introduces per-row activation counting (PRAC) to track aggressor activity. However, PRAC indiscriminately increments counters on every activation -- including benign refreshes -- while relying solely on explicit RFM operations for resets. Consequently, counters saturate even in an idle bank, triggering cascading mitigations and degrading performance. This vulnerability arises from a fundamental mismatch: PRAC tracks the aggressor but aims to protect the victim. We present Per-Victim-row hAmmered Counting (PVAC), a victim-based counting mechanism that aligns the counter semantics with the physical disturbance mechanism of RowHammer. PVAC increments the counters of victim rows, resets the activated row, and naturally bounds counter values under normal refresh. To enable efficient victim-based updates, PVAC employs a dedicated counter subarray (CSA) that performs all counter resets and increments concurrently with normal accesses, without timing overhead. We further devise an energy-efficient CSA layout that minimizes refresh-induced counter accesses. Through victim-based counting, PVAC supports higher hammering tolerance than PRAC while maintaining the same worst-case safety guarantee. Across benign workloads and adversarial attack patterns, PVAC avoids spurious Alerts, eliminates PRAC timing penalties, and achieves higher performance and lower energy consumption than prior PRAC-based defenses.
title PVAC: A RowHammer Mitigation Architecture Exploiting Per-victim-row Counting
topic Cryptography and Security
Hardware Architecture
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20576