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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20927 |
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| _version_ | 1866915990532521984 |
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| author | Pennekamp, Jan Lohmöller, Johannes Schütte, David Loos, Joscha Henze, Martin |
| author_facet | Pennekamp, Jan Lohmöller, Johannes Schütte, David Loos, Joscha Henze, Martin |
| contents | Preprints are essential for the timely and open dissemination of research. arXiv, the most widely used preprint service, takes the idea of open science one step further by not only publishing the actual preprints but also LaTeX sources and other files used to create them. As known from other contexts, such as GitHub repositories, and anecdotally exemplified for arXiv, making source code publicly available risks disclosing otherwise "hidden" information. Consequently, the public availability of paper sources raises the question of how much sensitive content is (unintentionally) disclosed through them.
In this paper, we systematically answer this question for all 2.7M arXiv submissions with available source files across three dimensions of source file-induced information disclosure: (1) inclusion of unnecessary files, (2) metadata embedded in files, and (3) irrelevant content in files such as source code comments. Our analysis reveals that nearly every arXiv submission contains some form of "hidden" information. Notable findings range from links to editable web documents for internal coordination over API and private keys to complete Git histories.
While different tools promise to remove such information from source files, we show that they fail to reliably achieve the intended cleaning functionality. To mitigate this situation, we provide ALC-NG to comprehensively remove files, metadata, and comments that are not needed to compile a LaTeX paper. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_20927 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints Pennekamp, Jan Lohmöller, Johannes Schütte, David Loos, Joscha Henze, Martin Cryptography and Security Preprints are essential for the timely and open dissemination of research. arXiv, the most widely used preprint service, takes the idea of open science one step further by not only publishing the actual preprints but also LaTeX sources and other files used to create them. As known from other contexts, such as GitHub repositories, and anecdotally exemplified for arXiv, making source code publicly available risks disclosing otherwise "hidden" information. Consequently, the public availability of paper sources raises the question of how much sensitive content is (unintentionally) disclosed through them. In this paper, we systematically answer this question for all 2.7M arXiv submissions with available source files across three dimensions of source file-induced information disclosure: (1) inclusion of unnecessary files, (2) metadata embedded in files, and (3) irrelevant content in files such as source code comments. Our analysis reveals that nearly every arXiv submission contains some form of "hidden" information. Notable findings range from links to editable web documents for internal coordination over API and private keys to complete Git histories. While different tools promise to remove such information from source files, we show that they fail to reliably achieve the intended cleaning functionality. To mitigate this situation, we provide ALC-NG to comprehensively remove files, metadata, and comments that are not needed to compile a LaTeX paper. |
| title | Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20927 |