Cover Image

Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Perrier, Elija
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Will AI Trade? A Computational Inversion of the No-Trade Theorem
by: Li, Hanyu, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Cost of EFX: Generalized-Mean Welfare and Complexity Dichotomies with Few Surplus Items
by: Lim, Eugene, et al.
Published: (2026)

Algorithmic Fairness and Social Welfare
by: Liang, Annie, et al.
Published: (2024)

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
by: Geffner, Ivan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Stabilizing Welfare-Maximizing Decisions via Endogenous Transfers
by: Kavner, Joshua
Published: (2026)

Misspecified Explore-then-Exploit Leads to Supra-Competitive Prices
by: Baek, Jackie, et al.
Published: (2026)

Human-AI Productivity Paradoxes: Modeling the Interplay of Skill, Effort, and AI Assistance
by: Aouad, Ali, et al.
Published: (2026)

A Revealed Preference Framework for AI Alignment
by: Suleymanov, Elchin
Published: (2026)

Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets
by: Sudhir, Abhimanyu Pallavi, et al.
Published: (2026)

Creative Ownership in the Age of AI
by: Liang, Annie, et al.
Published: (2026)

Two-Sided Time-Independent Regret for Matching Markets with Limited Interviews
by: Mirfakhar, Amirmahdi, et al.
Published: (2026)

Rational Adversaries and the Maintenance of Fragility: A Game-Theoretic Theory of Rational Stagnation
by: Hirota, Daisuke
Published: (2025)

Learned Collusion
by: Compte, Olivier
Published: (2023)

Artificial Intelligence for Multi-Unit Auction design
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Models
by: Laufer, Benjamin, et al.
Published: (2023)

Tell Me Why: Incentivizing Explanations
by: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Published: (2025)

Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation
by: Harris, Keegan, et al.
Published: (2023)

Understanding EFX Allocations: Counting and Variants
by: Neoh, Tzeh Yuan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Collective dynamics of strategic classification
by: Couto, Marta C., et al.
Published: (2025)

Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment
by: He, Kevin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Dueling Over Dessert, Mastering the Art of Repeated Cake Cutting
by: Brânzei, Simina, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Welfare Gap of Strategic Storage: Universal Bounds and Price Non-Linearity
by: Jiang, Zhile, et al.
Published: (2026)

Rationalizability, Iterated Dominance, and the Theorems of Radon and Carathéodory
by: Long, Roy
Published: (2024)

Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality
by: Curry, Michael J., et al.
Published: (2024)

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
by: Ferreira, Matheus V. X., et al.
Published: (2024)

On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus
by: Leshno, Jacob D., et al.
Published: (2024)

Prior-Independent Bidding Strategies for First-Price Auctions
by: Kumar, Rachitesh, et al.
Published: (2025)

Delegation and Verification Under AI
by: Huang, Lingxiao, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Backfiring Effect of Weak AI Safety Regulation
by: Laufer, Benjamin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Language-based game theory in the age of artificial intelligence
by: Capraro, Valerio, et al.
Published: (2024)

Strategic Algorithmic Monoculture: Experimental Evidence from Coordination Games
by: Ballestero, Gonzalo, et al.
Published: (2026)

Calibeating Made Simple
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2026)

A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Approximate Revenue Maximization for Diffusion Auctions
by: Huang, Yifan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location
by: Lam, Alexander, et al.
Published: (2023)

Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners
by: Easley, David, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
by: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Published: (2025)

Generalized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learning Agent
by: Lin, Tao, et al.
Published: (2024)

Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2024)

Dominated Actions in Imperfect-Information Games
by: Ganzfried, Sam
Published: (2025)