SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Radaideh, RoÝah, Khreis, Ali
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Radaideh, RoÝah
Khreis, Ali
author_facet Radaideh, RoÝah
Khreis, Ali
contents Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_23905
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems
Radaideh, RoÝah
Khreis, Ali
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
C.2.0; D.2.1; I.2.7
Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.
title SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
C.2.0; D.2.1; I.2.7
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23905