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Learning is Revelation in Disguise: Improved Regret and Equivalence Results for Dynamic Pricing

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale:	Zuo, Shiliang
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2026
Soggetti:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
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