Price as Focal Point: Prediction Markets,Conditional Reflexivity, and the Politics of Common Knowledge
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arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908998883606528 |
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| author | Nechepurenko, Maksym |
| author_facet | Nechepurenko, Maksym |
| contents | Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public probabilities that organize the behavior of voters, donors, journalists, traders, and institutions in ways that can be self-fulfilling or self-defeating. Most existing work asks whether prediction markets forecast accurately; this paper asks whether accurate forecasting is even the right criterion for a market that has become a public coordination device. Drawing on transaction-level evidence from the 2024 U.S. presidential election, we show that the social force of a market signal depends less on its size than on its persistence, the breadth of responding trader types, and cross-platform consensus. We introduce a Signal Credibility Index (SCI) -- combining the variance ratio VR(6), a two-sidedness diagnostic, and a trader-concentration adjustment -- as a microstructure-grounded criterion for predicting when price moves acquire behavioral traction. Applied to three major 2024 political shocks, the framework reveals that superficially similar events generated qualitatively distinct signal types with different implications for elite coordination. A cross-platform comparison establishes a systematic decoupling of social authority from epistemic robustness: the most visible market produced the least accurate forecasts. The framework carries direct implications for regulating prediction markets as democratic information infrastructure. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_24147 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Price as Focal Point: Prediction Markets,Conditional Reflexivity, and the Politics of Common Knowledge Nechepurenko, Maksym General Economics Economics Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Trading and Market Microstructure 91B26 J.4; K.4.1 Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public probabilities that organize the behavior of voters, donors, journalists, traders, and institutions in ways that can be self-fulfilling or self-defeating. Most existing work asks whether prediction markets forecast accurately; this paper asks whether accurate forecasting is even the right criterion for a market that has become a public coordination device. Drawing on transaction-level evidence from the 2024 U.S. presidential election, we show that the social force of a market signal depends less on its size than on its persistence, the breadth of responding trader types, and cross-platform consensus. We introduce a Signal Credibility Index (SCI) -- combining the variance ratio VR(6), a two-sidedness diagnostic, and a trader-concentration adjustment -- as a microstructure-grounded criterion for predicting when price moves acquire behavioral traction. Applied to three major 2024 political shocks, the framework reveals that superficially similar events generated qualitatively distinct signal types with different implications for elite coordination. A cross-platform comparison establishes a systematic decoupling of social authority from epistemic robustness: the most visible market produced the least accurate forecasts. The framework carries direct implications for regulating prediction markets as democratic information infrastructure. |
| title | Price as Focal Point: Prediction Markets,Conditional Reflexivity, and the Politics of Common Knowledge |
| topic | General Economics Economics Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Trading and Market Microstructure 91B26 J.4; K.4.1 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24147 |