Profiling Resilient to Change in Probe Position
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866908995799744512 |
|---|---|
| author | Bursztein, Elie Gruber, Michael Král, Karel Picod, Jean-Michel Probst, Matthias Sigl, Georg |
| author_facet | Bursztein, Elie Gruber, Michael Král, Karel Picod, Jean-Michel Probst, Matthias Sigl, Georg |
| contents | Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often provide a very valuable source of side channel leakage. During the evaluation of a chip for electro-magnetic side channel emissions one needs to position an electro-magnetic probe in an advantageous position relative to the chip. Previous literature focused on hot-spot finding and to a lower extend repositioning. Trace augmentations have been considered to aid portability of profiling using one physical device and attacking another device. This paper focuses on training a single neural network using traces from multiple EM probe positions to detect leakage from a larger area over the attacked device. We provide dual evaluation of EM traces - from two completely independent labs - profiling on data from one lab and attacking traces from the other lab. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_24701 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Profiling Resilient to Change in Probe Position Bursztein, Elie Gruber, Michael Král, Karel Picod, Jean-Michel Probst, Matthias Sigl, Georg Cryptography and Security Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often provide a very valuable source of side channel leakage. During the evaluation of a chip for electro-magnetic side channel emissions one needs to position an electro-magnetic probe in an advantageous position relative to the chip. Previous literature focused on hot-spot finding and to a lower extend repositioning. Trace augmentations have been considered to aid portability of profiling using one physical device and attacking another device. This paper focuses on training a single neural network using traces from multiple EM probe positions to detect leakage from a larger area over the attacked device. We provide dual evaluation of EM traces - from two completely independent labs - profiling on data from one lab and attacking traces from the other lab. |
| title | Profiling Resilient to Change in Probe Position |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24701 |