Coordination in complex environments
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910170610663424 |
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| author | Dall'Ara, Pietro |
| author_facet | Dall'Ara, Pietro |
| contents | Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To study the interplay of coordination and informational ``complexity'', I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I identify a new conformity phenomenon. This effect may push towards the exploration of unknown alternatives or constitute a status-quo bias, depending on the network structure of players' interactions. In an application, I show that an organization with decentralized authority can implement profit maximization in a sufficiently complex environment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_24757 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Coordination in complex environments Dall'Ara, Pietro Theoretical Economics Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To study the interplay of coordination and informational ``complexity'', I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I identify a new conformity phenomenon. This effect may push towards the exploration of unknown alternatives or constitute a status-quo bias, depending on the network structure of players' interactions. In an application, I show that an organization with decentralized authority can implement profit maximization in a sufficiently complex environment. |
| title | Coordination in complex environments |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24757 |