Regulation of Rumor Propagation via (Multi-Leader) Stackelberg Graphon Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910173006659584 |
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| author | Liu, Huaning Dayanikli, Gokce |
| author_facet | Liu, Huaning Dayanikli, Gokce |
| contents | We study the control of rumor propagation in large networked populations by using Stackelberg graphon games. We first introduce a principal who wants to incentivize the spread of her preferred news and discourage the spread of non-preferred news. We define the Stackelberg graphon game equilibrium (SGGE), characterize the graphon game Nash equilibrium (GGNE) with a forward-backward differential equation system, and establish existence results. We further formulate a multi-leader model with two competing principals, each incentivizing her own preferred news. Finally, we propose a bi-level algorithm for computing (multi-leader) Stackelberg graphon game equilibria and conclude with numerical experiments where we show that existence of competing principals will result in strong opinion divisions in the population. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_25258 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Regulation of Rumor Propagation via (Multi-Leader) Stackelberg Graphon Games Liu, Huaning Dayanikli, Gokce Optimization and Control We study the control of rumor propagation in large networked populations by using Stackelberg graphon games. We first introduce a principal who wants to incentivize the spread of her preferred news and discourage the spread of non-preferred news. We define the Stackelberg graphon game equilibrium (SGGE), characterize the graphon game Nash equilibrium (GGNE) with a forward-backward differential equation system, and establish existence results. We further formulate a multi-leader model with two competing principals, each incentivizing her own preferred news. Finally, we propose a bi-level algorithm for computing (multi-leader) Stackelberg graphon game equilibria and conclude with numerical experiments where we show that existence of competing principals will result in strong opinion divisions in the population. |
| title | Regulation of Rumor Propagation via (Multi-Leader) Stackelberg Graphon Games |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.25258 |