Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866908999044038656 |
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| author | Greinecker, Michael Meier, Martin Podczeck, Konrad |
| author_facet | Greinecker, Michael Meier, Martin Podczeck, Konrad |
| contents | Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a class of infinite extensive form games in which information behaves continuously as a function of past actions and define a natural notion of sequential equilibrium for this class. Sequential equilibria exist in this class and refine Nash equilibria. In standard finite extensive-form games, our definition selects the same strategy profiles as the traditional notion of sequential equilibrium. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_25784 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games Greinecker, Michael Meier, Martin Podczeck, Konrad Theoretical Economics Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a class of infinite extensive form games in which information behaves continuously as a function of past actions and define a natural notion of sequential equilibrium for this class. Sequential equilibria exist in this class and refine Nash equilibria. In standard finite extensive-form games, our definition selects the same strategy profiles as the traditional notion of sequential equilibrium. |
| title | Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.25784 |