Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913072587735040 |
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| author | Jain, Atulya |
| author_facet | Jain, Atulya |
| contents | We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_26443 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback Jain, Atulya Theoretical Economics We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff. |
| title | Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26443 |