Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Jain, Atulya
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Jain, Atulya
author_facet Jain, Atulya
contents We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_26443
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
Jain, Atulya
Theoretical Economics
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.
title Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26443