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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Badev, Anton, Pavlov, Martin, Zlatanov, Boyan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26487
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author Badev, Anton
Pavlov, Martin
Zlatanov, Boyan
author_facet Badev, Anton
Pavlov, Martin
Zlatanov, Boyan
contents We analyze a canonical extension of the Stackelberg duopoly to a sequential framework, where each firm strategically anticipates the reactions of all subsequent players. In a triopoly (three-firm) settings, we obtain existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium via a reformulation of the equilibrium conditions that draws on coupled fixed-point theory. Even with linear demand, convergence of myopic best-response dynamics is not guaranteed. A recursive equilibrium formulation enables the analysis of the limiting case as the number of participants grow.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_26487
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Equilibrium in the Canonical Stackelberg Triopoly via Response Functions and Fixed Point Theory
Badev, Anton
Pavlov, Martin
Zlatanov, Boyan
Functional Analysis
47H10, 54H25, 46B20, 65D15, 91A10
We analyze a canonical extension of the Stackelberg duopoly to a sequential framework, where each firm strategically anticipates the reactions of all subsequent players. In a triopoly (three-firm) settings, we obtain existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium via a reformulation of the equilibrium conditions that draws on coupled fixed-point theory. Even with linear demand, convergence of myopic best-response dynamics is not guaranteed. A recursive equilibrium formulation enables the analysis of the limiting case as the number of participants grow.
title Equilibrium in the Canonical Stackelberg Triopoly via Response Functions and Fixed Point Theory
topic Functional Analysis
47H10, 54H25, 46B20, 65D15, 91A10
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26487