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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26746 |
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| _version_ | 1866913072973611008 |
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| author | Cianchi, Silvia Sanjab, Anibal Grammatico, Sergio |
| author_facet | Cianchi, Silvia Sanjab, Anibal Grammatico, Sergio |
| contents | Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem may become ill-posed, thus leading standard algorithms to potentially fail to converge. This paper addresses this issue by introducing an optimal selection at the lower-level game, hereby defining a Stackelberg game with induced equilibrium selection. To this end, we enable the leader to augment the followers' game with an additional vanishing term that acts as an incentive. We then propose a follower-agnostic zeroth-order method, whereby the leader converges to a solution of the resulting problem by iteratively probing the followers and jointly updating its decision variable and the incentive term. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_26746 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Induced Stackelberg Equilibrium Seeking via Iterative Tikhonov Regularization Cianchi, Silvia Sanjab, Anibal Grammatico, Sergio Optimization and Control 90C33 (Primary) 90C30, 91A65 (Secondary) Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem may become ill-posed, thus leading standard algorithms to potentially fail to converge. This paper addresses this issue by introducing an optimal selection at the lower-level game, hereby defining a Stackelberg game with induced equilibrium selection. To this end, we enable the leader to augment the followers' game with an additional vanishing term that acts as an incentive. We then propose a follower-agnostic zeroth-order method, whereby the leader converges to a solution of the resulting problem by iteratively probing the followers and jointly updating its decision variable and the incentive term. |
| title | Induced Stackelberg Equilibrium Seeking via Iterative Tikhonov Regularization |
| topic | Optimization and Control 90C33 (Primary) 90C30, 91A65 (Secondary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.26746 |