Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913075460833280 |
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| author | Rudov, Kirill Sandomirskiy, Fedor Yariv, Leeat |
| author_facet | Rudov, Kirill Sandomirskiy, Fedor Yariv, Leeat |
| contents | Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives. Our key insight is a detail-free criterion: any Nash equilibrium with three or more randomizing agents is generically improvable. We refine this insight to specific classes of games and objectives, including Pareto and utilitarian welfare, and provide constructive methods to obtain improvements. Our findings underscore the ubiquity of improvable Nash equilibria and the crucial role of correlation in enhancing strategic outcomes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2604_27258 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation Rudov, Kirill Sandomirskiy, Fedor Yariv, Leeat Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives. Our key insight is a detail-free criterion: any Nash equilibrium with three or more randomizing agents is generically improvable. We refine this insight to specific classes of games and objectives, including Pareto and utilitarian welfare, and provide constructive methods to obtain improvements. Our findings underscore the ubiquity of improvable Nash equilibria and the crucial role of correlation in enhancing strategic outcomes. |
| title | Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.27258 |