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Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Cui, Shuang, Huang, He, Sun, Yu-e, Xue, Chen
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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