KingsGuard: Enclave Data Protection Under Real-World TEE Vulnerabilities
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913093119901696 |
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| author | Allaqband, Saltanat Firdous S, Deepanjali G, Rohit Srinivas R Gosain, Devashish Rebeiro, Chester |
| author_facet | Allaqband, Saltanat Firdous S, Deepanjali G, Rohit Srinivas R Gosain, Devashish Rebeiro, Chester |
| contents | Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a cornerstone for securing sensitive computations by providing isolated enclaves protected from untrusted software. However, their security guarantees are undermined by vulnerabilities in both the enclave code and the underlying hardware design, which can allow sensitive data to leak despite strong isolation guarantees. This paper presents KINGSGUARD, a novel TEE design that systematically monitors and controls the propagation of sensitive data within an enclave. By enforcing fine-grained data flow tracking and checks in hardware, our approach ensures that sensitive data does not leave the enclave boundary, thus bridging the gap between the idealized threat models of TEEs and their practical realizations. Additionally, to balance security with practical functionality, we introduce controlled declassification at enclave boundaries, allowing intentional release of data to the outside world. Our implementation of KINGSGUARD on a RISC-V processor has a 10.8% hardware area overhead when synthesized on FPGA and a 5.69% performance overhead. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_00613 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | KingsGuard: Enclave Data Protection Under Real-World TEE Vulnerabilities Allaqband, Saltanat Firdous S, Deepanjali G, Rohit Srinivas R Gosain, Devashish Rebeiro, Chester Cryptography and Security Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a cornerstone for securing sensitive computations by providing isolated enclaves protected from untrusted software. However, their security guarantees are undermined by vulnerabilities in both the enclave code and the underlying hardware design, which can allow sensitive data to leak despite strong isolation guarantees. This paper presents KINGSGUARD, a novel TEE design that systematically monitors and controls the propagation of sensitive data within an enclave. By enforcing fine-grained data flow tracking and checks in hardware, our approach ensures that sensitive data does not leave the enclave boundary, thus bridging the gap between the idealized threat models of TEEs and their practical realizations. Additionally, to balance security with practical functionality, we introduce controlled declassification at enclave boundaries, allowing intentional release of data to the outside world. Our implementation of KINGSGUARD on a RISC-V processor has a 10.8% hardware area overhead when synthesized on FPGA and a 5.69% performance overhead. |
| title | KingsGuard: Enclave Data Protection Under Real-World TEE Vulnerabilities |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00613 |