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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00962 |
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| _version_ | 1866910184798945280 |
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| author | Kiang, Windsor |
| author_facet | Kiang, Windsor |
| contents | Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an induced representation from a Young subgroup. We then prove that such games are supported solely by irreducible representations, via the Littlewood-Richardson rule, where the depth of interactions is strictly bounded by the size of the minority group. Therefore, the algebraic structure of the game filters out the complexities of the general kernel $W$. We then show that this filtration constrains any symmetric linear value to a specific subspace. This recovers the Shapley value uniquely for $m=2$ under standard axioms. Finally, we explore applications to the UN Security Council and complementary goods markets to illustrate the practical power of this approach. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_00962 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Induced Representations in Cooperative Games with Homogeneous Groups of Players Kiang, Windsor Computer Science and Game Theory Combinatorics Group Theory Representation Theory 91A12 (Primary), 20C30, 05E10 (Secondary) Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an induced representation from a Young subgroup. We then prove that such games are supported solely by irreducible representations, via the Littlewood-Richardson rule, where the depth of interactions is strictly bounded by the size of the minority group. Therefore, the algebraic structure of the game filters out the complexities of the general kernel $W$. We then show that this filtration constrains any symmetric linear value to a specific subspace. This recovers the Shapley value uniquely for $m=2$ under standard axioms. Finally, we explore applications to the UN Security Council and complementary goods markets to illustrate the practical power of this approach. |
| title | Induced Representations in Cooperative Games with Homogeneous Groups of Players |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Combinatorics Group Theory Representation Theory 91A12 (Primary), 20C30, 05E10 (Secondary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00962 |