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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01166 |
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| _version_ | 1866915980698976256 |
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| author | Wu, Hongyu Rodriguez, Raul |
| author_facet | Wu, Hongyu Rodriguez, Raul |
| contents | Silent-watch operation makes electrified ground platforms depend on supervisory energy management because mission loads must be sustained from stored energy while the engine is off. This paper develops a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for this operating mode. The benchmark connects battery state-of-charge (SOC) spoofing to mission outcomes rather than evaluating the attack only through detector response or control error. It combines a reduced-order DC-bus model, residual-based detection, fallback shedding, and five mission-facing metrics for endurance, critical-load service, priority-weighted loss-of-load cost, unsafe-voltage exposure, and detection delay. The study shows that SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-versus-impact envelope. Small biases have limited mission effect, intermediate biases produce an endurance deficit well approximated by a first-order expression in bias magnitude, shed power, and average battery draw, and large biases disable the SOC-driven guard. The results also show that defense value depends on fallback depth, not detection alone. An undersized fallback action can leave the Defended case failing to complete the mission despite early detection. MATLAB-to-Simulink parity across five regression scenarios provides a software-verified basis for hardware-in-the-loop testing. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_01166 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Mission-Centric Cyber-Resilience Benchmark for Silent-Watch Operation of Electrified Ground-Platform Power Architectures Wu, Hongyu Rodriguez, Raul Systems and Control Silent-watch operation makes electrified ground platforms depend on supervisory energy management because mission loads must be sustained from stored energy while the engine is off. This paper develops a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for this operating mode. The benchmark connects battery state-of-charge (SOC) spoofing to mission outcomes rather than evaluating the attack only through detector response or control error. It combines a reduced-order DC-bus model, residual-based detection, fallback shedding, and five mission-facing metrics for endurance, critical-load service, priority-weighted loss-of-load cost, unsafe-voltage exposure, and detection delay. The study shows that SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-versus-impact envelope. Small biases have limited mission effect, intermediate biases produce an endurance deficit well approximated by a first-order expression in bias magnitude, shed power, and average battery draw, and large biases disable the SOC-driven guard. The results also show that defense value depends on fallback depth, not detection alone. An undersized fallback action can leave the Defended case failing to complete the mission despite early detection. MATLAB-to-Simulink parity across five regression scenarios provides a software-verified basis for hardware-in-the-loop testing. |
| title | A Mission-Centric Cyber-Resilience Benchmark for Silent-Watch Operation of Electrified Ground-Platform Power Architectures |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01166 |