Differentially Private Runtime Monitoring
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866914550889054208 |
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| author | Finkbeiner, Bernd Scheerer, Frederik |
| author_facet | Finkbeiner, Bernd Scheerer, Frederik |
| contents | Modern stream-based monitors collect detailed statistics of the runtime behavior of the system under observation. If the system runs in a privacy-sensitive context, this poses the risk of disclosing sensitive information. Differential privacy is the state-of-the-art approach for protecting sensitive information, however, integrating it into runtime monitoring is challenging: temporal operators can cause individual input values to influence multiple outputs over time, leading to repeated disclosure of private information. We propose an approach that automatically enforces differential privacy in stream-based monitoring specifications by analyzing temporal dependencies and injecting carefully calibrated noise into the specification. To preserve the utility of the outputs, we identify strategically chosen positions in the specification for noise injection and leverage tree-based mechanisms to mitigate the accuracy loss caused by noise injected into aggregation operators. We demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of our approach in a case study on monitoring public transportation usage. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_02391 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Differentially Private Runtime Monitoring Finkbeiner, Bernd Scheerer, Frederik Cryptography and Security Logic in Computer Science Modern stream-based monitors collect detailed statistics of the runtime behavior of the system under observation. If the system runs in a privacy-sensitive context, this poses the risk of disclosing sensitive information. Differential privacy is the state-of-the-art approach for protecting sensitive information, however, integrating it into runtime monitoring is challenging: temporal operators can cause individual input values to influence multiple outputs over time, leading to repeated disclosure of private information. We propose an approach that automatically enforces differential privacy in stream-based monitoring specifications by analyzing temporal dependencies and injecting carefully calibrated noise into the specification. To preserve the utility of the outputs, we identify strategically chosen positions in the specification for noise injection and leverage tree-based mechanisms to mitigate the accuracy loss caused by noise injected into aggregation operators. We demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of our approach in a case study on monitoring public transportation usage. |
| title | Differentially Private Runtime Monitoring |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Logic in Computer Science |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.02391 |