Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866909016706252800 |
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| author | Zhang, Ao Liu, Yunwen Zhang, Ren Shan, Yingdi Wu, Yongwei |
| author_facet | Zhang, Ao Liu, Yunwen Zhang, Ren Shan, Yingdi Wu, Yongwei |
| contents | This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a comprehensive evaluation of order flow behavioral patterns and economic purposes. To address this gap, we analyze Ethereum transactions from September 2023 to August 2025 to characterize Exclusive Order Flows (EOFs) and non-atomic Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) -- the missing components corresponding to these behavioral and economic dimensions, respectively. We introduce a novel exclusivity metric based on Kullback-Leibler divergence and employ supervised learning to identify 75 EOFs and 322 non-atomic MEV flows, which account for 71\% and 23\% of trading-related builder revenue. A longitudinal analysis of builder strategies across these dimensions delineates the market's evolution into four distinct eras, revealing that while EOFs were instrumental in establishing early dominance, incumbents have since decoupled market share from immediate EOF dependency by leveraging entrenched network effects. Ultimately, we conclude that builder centralization is an emergent property of the PBS framework itself, as the architecture systematically violates the fundamental prerequisites of a competitive market. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_04471 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization Zhang, Ao Liu, Yunwen Zhang, Ren Shan, Yingdi Wu, Yongwei Cryptography and Security This study investigates the rapid centralization of the Ethereum builder market under the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture. We argue that existing research, by focusing predominantly on influential order flows, lacks a comprehensive evaluation of order flow behavioral patterns and economic purposes. To address this gap, we analyze Ethereum transactions from September 2023 to August 2025 to characterize Exclusive Order Flows (EOFs) and non-atomic Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) -- the missing components corresponding to these behavioral and economic dimensions, respectively. We introduce a novel exclusivity metric based on Kullback-Leibler divergence and employ supervised learning to identify 75 EOFs and 322 non-atomic MEV flows, which account for 71\% and 23\% of trading-related builder revenue. A longitudinal analysis of builder strategies across these dimensions delineates the market's evolution into four distinct eras, revealing that while EOFs were instrumental in establishing early dominance, incumbents have since decoupled market share from immediate EOF dependency by leveraging entrenched network effects. Ultimately, we conclude that builder centralization is an emergent property of the PBS framework itself, as the architecture systematically violates the fundamental prerequisites of a competitive market. |
| title | Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.04471 |