Securing the Web with HSTS-Enforced
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866916060572155904 |
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| author | van Diepen, Aaron Zapletal, Adrian Kuipers, Fernando |
| author_facet | van Diepen, Aaron Zapletal, Adrian Kuipers, Fernando |
| contents | TLS stripping attacks expose sensitive web traffic by forcing secure HTTPS connections to fall back to unencrypted HTTP. At present, protection against these attacks relies on website operators explicitly opting into security by deploying mechanisms such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers. These mechanisms have significant limitations: some are weak or difficult to configure, which raises the risk of misconfiguration and reduces practical adoption; others violate HTTP backward compatibility; at least one can even be abused to enable unintended user tracking.
We introduce HSTS-Enforced, a mechanism that eliminates the remaining attack surface for TLS stripping while still allowing operators to securely specify that their websites need to be accessed over HTTP when necessary, thereby maintaining accessibility. To achieve this, we flip the current opt-in security model to an opt-out model: all connections default to HTTPS, and operators can explicitly opt out if their websites require HTTP using so-called HTTP-Required indicators. We propose two such HTTP-Required indicators: a new DNS record and an HTTP-Required Preload list. We evaluate HSTS-Enforced under multiple deployment scenarios, demonstrating that it blocks all practical TLS stripping attempts while maintaining compatibility for sites that require HTTP - without introducing overhead in the typical case. Finally, we outline a practical transition path to accelerate global adoption. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_04642 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Securing the Web with HSTS-Enforced van Diepen, Aaron Zapletal, Adrian Kuipers, Fernando Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture TLS stripping attacks expose sensitive web traffic by forcing secure HTTPS connections to fall back to unencrypted HTTP. At present, protection against these attacks relies on website operators explicitly opting into security by deploying mechanisms such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers. These mechanisms have significant limitations: some are weak or difficult to configure, which raises the risk of misconfiguration and reduces practical adoption; others violate HTTP backward compatibility; at least one can even be abused to enable unintended user tracking. We introduce HSTS-Enforced, a mechanism that eliminates the remaining attack surface for TLS stripping while still allowing operators to securely specify that their websites need to be accessed over HTTP when necessary, thereby maintaining accessibility. To achieve this, we flip the current opt-in security model to an opt-out model: all connections default to HTTPS, and operators can explicitly opt out if their websites require HTTP using so-called HTTP-Required indicators. We propose two such HTTP-Required indicators: a new DNS record and an HTTP-Required Preload list. We evaluate HSTS-Enforced under multiple deployment scenarios, demonstrating that it blocks all practical TLS stripping attempts while maintaining compatibility for sites that require HTTP - without introducing overhead in the typical case. Finally, we outline a practical transition path to accelerate global adoption. |
| title | Securing the Web with HSTS-Enforced |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.04642 |