A UEFI System with SPDM to Protect Against Unauthorized Device Connections
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866909023264047104 |
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| author | de Freitas, Ágatha Simplicio Jr, Marcos A. Albertini, Bruno C. Alves, Renan C. A. |
| author_facet | de Freitas, Ágatha Simplicio Jr, Marcos A. Albertini, Bruno C. Alves, Renan C. A. |
| contents | Attackers willing to compromise computing systems can use malicious peripherals as an attack vector, threatening users that cannot verify the hardware's authenticity. To address this problem, our work uses the Security Protocol and Data Model to propose a UEFI system capable of authenticating PCIe and USB devices trying to connect with it. We also develop an open source proof-of-concept using emulation to evaluate and illustrate our proposal, which is capable of restricting the devices' connections to only those allowed, thus protecting the system against malicious peripherals. Then, using kernel virtualization features to evaluate the emulation, we collect the number of instructions and CPU cycles during boot. Our experiments reveal that, during firmware execution, the number of instructions and the number of CPU cycles increased respectively 13% and 8% on average. This processing overhead is acceptable in view of enhanced security. Institutions requiring high security levels can leverage our proof-of-concept to tailor their own system based on their own requirements. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_06744 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A UEFI System with SPDM to Protect Against Unauthorized Device Connections de Freitas, Ágatha Simplicio Jr, Marcos A. Albertini, Bruno C. Alves, Renan C. A. Cryptography and Security Attackers willing to compromise computing systems can use malicious peripherals as an attack vector, threatening users that cannot verify the hardware's authenticity. To address this problem, our work uses the Security Protocol and Data Model to propose a UEFI system capable of authenticating PCIe and USB devices trying to connect with it. We also develop an open source proof-of-concept using emulation to evaluate and illustrate our proposal, which is capable of restricting the devices' connections to only those allowed, thus protecting the system against malicious peripherals. Then, using kernel virtualization features to evaluate the emulation, we collect the number of instructions and CPU cycles during boot. Our experiments reveal that, during firmware execution, the number of instructions and the number of CPU cycles increased respectively 13% and 8% on average. This processing overhead is acceptable in view of enhanced security. Institutions requiring high security levels can leverage our proof-of-concept to tailor their own system based on their own requirements. |
| title | A UEFI System with SPDM to Protect Against Unauthorized Device Connections |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06744 |