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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06812 |
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| _version_ | 1866917469785948160 |
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| author | Li, Chaofan Zhang, Lyuye Zhai, Jintao Feng, Siyue Yang, Xichun Wang, Huahao Dou, Shihan Ji, Yu Hu, Yutao Wu, Yueming Liu, Yang Zou, Deqing |
| author_facet | Li, Chaofan Zhang, Lyuye Zhai, Jintao Feng, Siyue Yang, Xichun Wang, Huahao Dou, Shihan Ji, Yu Hu, Yutao Wu, Yueming Liu, Yang Zou, Deqing |
| contents | LLM-based agentic systems are rapidly evolving to perform complex autonomous tasks through dynamic tool invocation, stateful memory management, and multi-agent collaboration. However, this semantics-driven execution paradigm creates a severe semantic gap between low-level physical events and high-level execution intent, making post-hoc security auditing fundamentally difficult. Existing representation mechanisms, including static SBOMs and runtime logs, provide only fragmented evidence and fail to capture cognitive-state evolution, capability bindings, persistent memory contamination, and cascading risk propagation across interacting agents. To bridge this gap, we propose Agent-BOM, a unified structural representation for agent security auditing. Agent-BOM models an agentic system as a hierarchical attributed directed graph that separates static capability bases, such as models, tools, and long-term memory, from dynamic runtime semantic states, such as goals, reasoning trajectories, and actions. These layers are connected through semantic edges and security attributes, transforming fragmented execution traces into queryable audit paths. Building on Agent-BOM, we develop a graph-query-based paradigm for path-level risk assessment and instantiate it with the OWASP Agentic Top 10. We further implement an auditing plugin in the OpenClaw environment to construct Agent-BOM from live executions. Evaluation on representative real-world agentic attack scenarios shows that Agent-BOM can reconstruct stealthy attack chains, including cross-session memory poisoning and tool misuse, capability supply-chain hijacking and unexpected code execution, multi-agent ecosystem hijacking, and privilege and trust abuse. These results demonstrate that Agent-BOM provides a unified and auditable foundation for root-cause analysis and security adjudication in complex agentic ecosystems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_06812 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Towards Security-Auditable LLM Agents: A Unified Graph Representation Li, Chaofan Zhang, Lyuye Zhai, Jintao Feng, Siyue Yang, Xichun Wang, Huahao Dou, Shihan Ji, Yu Hu, Yutao Wu, Yueming Liu, Yang Zou, Deqing Artificial Intelligence LLM-based agentic systems are rapidly evolving to perform complex autonomous tasks through dynamic tool invocation, stateful memory management, and multi-agent collaboration. However, this semantics-driven execution paradigm creates a severe semantic gap between low-level physical events and high-level execution intent, making post-hoc security auditing fundamentally difficult. Existing representation mechanisms, including static SBOMs and runtime logs, provide only fragmented evidence and fail to capture cognitive-state evolution, capability bindings, persistent memory contamination, and cascading risk propagation across interacting agents. To bridge this gap, we propose Agent-BOM, a unified structural representation for agent security auditing. Agent-BOM models an agentic system as a hierarchical attributed directed graph that separates static capability bases, such as models, tools, and long-term memory, from dynamic runtime semantic states, such as goals, reasoning trajectories, and actions. These layers are connected through semantic edges and security attributes, transforming fragmented execution traces into queryable audit paths. Building on Agent-BOM, we develop a graph-query-based paradigm for path-level risk assessment and instantiate it with the OWASP Agentic Top 10. We further implement an auditing plugin in the OpenClaw environment to construct Agent-BOM from live executions. Evaluation on representative real-world agentic attack scenarios shows that Agent-BOM can reconstruct stealthy attack chains, including cross-session memory poisoning and tool misuse, capability supply-chain hijacking and unexpected code execution, multi-agent ecosystem hijacking, and privilege and trust abuse. These results demonstrate that Agent-BOM provides a unified and auditable foundation for root-cause analysis and security adjudication in complex agentic ecosystems. |
| title | Towards Security-Auditable LLM Agents: A Unified Graph Representation |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06812 |