Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914543287926784 |
|---|---|
| author | Giordano, Francesco |
| author_facet | Giordano, Francesco |
| contents | We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of finitely many random variables and form beliefs by maximum-entropy inference. We obtain two characterizations. When message spaces are unrestricted, implementable outcomes coincide with jointly coherent outcomes, expanding the set of correlated equilibria. With canonical mechanisms, implementability reduces to a single cross-entropy condition: the target outcome must lie on the cross-entropy level set of some correlated equilibrium that passes through that equilibrium itself. Examples and several classes of games illustrate the reach of the framework. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_07469 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities Giordano, Francesco Theoretical Economics We study which outcomes are implementable by disclosing coarse statistics of a data-generating process rather than its full distribution. Players observe data whose joint distribution is only partially known: they know the expectations of finitely many random variables and form beliefs by maximum-entropy inference. We obtain two characterizations. When message spaces are unrestricted, implementable outcomes coincide with jointly coherent outcomes, expanding the set of correlated equilibria. With canonical mechanisms, implementability reduces to a single cross-entropy condition: the target outcome must lie on the cross-entropy level set of some correlated equilibrium that passes through that equilibrium itself. Examples and several classes of games illustrate the reach of the framework. |
| title | Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.07469 |