Image de couverture de livre

Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Giordano, Francesco
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
par: Bergemann, Dirk, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Partially Identified Ambiguity
par: Lim, Cheaheon
Publié: (2026)

Coordination in complex environments
par: Dall'Ara, Pietro
Publié: (2026)

Coordinate-free utility theory
par: Aryal, Safal Raman
Publié: (2025)

Coordinated Shirking in Technology Adoption
par: Tenev, Nicholas H.
Publié: (2025)

Entry Deterrence with Partial Reputation Spillovers
par: Khachatryan, Rubik, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Exponential Discounting under Partial Efficiency
par: Gauthier, Charles
Publié: (2025)

Partially rational preferences under ambiguity
par: Nakamura, Kensei, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender
par: Jiang, Shaofei
Publié: (2024)

Expert Incentives under Partially Contractible States
par: Xia, Zizhe
Publié: (2025)

Coordination Failures and Stackelberg Leadership in Housing Development with Network Effects
par: Rangan, Vaibhav
Publié: (2026)

The partial adoption trap: Coordination failure, trust, and cultural lock-in in health AI adoption
par: Ercole, Ari
Publié: (2026)

Coordinating Resource Allocation during Product Transitions Using a Multifollower Bilevel Programming Model
par: Khorramfar, Rahman, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Self-Confirming Mechanisms
par: Feng, Zhiming, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Power and Freedom in Mechanisms
par: Basteck, Christian, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
par: Doval, Laura, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Complete Exchange Mechanisms
par: Kitahara, Minoru, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Visibly Fair Mechanisms
par: Bó, Inácio, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Local Priority Mechanisms
par: Root, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Contextually Private Mechanisms
par: Haupt, Andreas, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Designing Simple Mechanisms
par: Li, Shengwu
Publié: (2024)

Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
par: Feffer, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Mechanism Design by a Politician
par: Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori
Publié: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
par: Häfner, Samuel, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
par: Balzer, Benjamin, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange
par: Manjunath, Vikram, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Pricing Novel Goods
par: Giovannoni, Francesco, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Lexicographic Robustness and the Efficiency of Optimal Mechanisms
par: Kambhampati, Ashwin
Publié: (2026)

Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
par: Root, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2020)

On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms
par: Wang, Wenqian, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Optimal Refund Mechanism with Consumer Learning
par: Lyu, Qianjun
Publié: (2024)

A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
par: Grigoryan, Aram, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Emergence of Homophily under Contextual Mechanisms
par: Weng, Jiaxing, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
par: Bergemann, Dirk, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Dynamic Mechanism Collapse: A Boundary Characterization
par: Zeng, Xiaopeng, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
par: Ball, Ian, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
par: Troyan, Peter
Publié: (2022)

Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
par: Yan, Eric
Publié: (2024)

Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
par: Xie, Jiarui
Publié: (2024)

Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
par: Kattwinkel, Deniz, et autres
Publié: (2024)