LLM Advertisement based on Neuron Auctions

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Yun, Peiran, Xu, Wenxin, Liu, Jiayuan, Zhang, Yihang, Zeng, Liang, Kong, Lingkai, Wang, Tonghan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Yun, Peiran
Xu, Wenxin
Liu, Jiayuan
Zhang, Yihang
Zeng, Liang
Kong, Lingkai
Wang, Tonghan
author_facet Yun, Peiran
Xu, Wenxin
Liu, Jiayuan
Zhang, Yihang
Zeng, Liang
Kong, Lingkai
Wang, Tonghan
contents As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coherence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous mechanism design intractable. To bridge this gap, we introduce Neuron Auctions, a novel paradigm that shifts the auction object from the surface text space to the LLM's internal representations. Leveraging mechanistic interpretability, we identify brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neurons and demonstrate that competing brands activate within approximately orthogonal subspaces. This near-perfect independence allows us to define continuous, disentangled intervention budgets (specifically, neuron counts and amplification factors) as auctionable commodities. Building on this computational carrier, we design a continuous menu-based auction mechanism that naturally guarantees strategy-proofness and optimizes revenue for the platform. By explicitly incorporating a user utility penalty into the platform's optimization objective, our framework dynamically prices out overly aggressive interventions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Neuron Auctions effectively preserve natural discourse quality while achieving an optimal alignment between commercial incentives and user satisfaction.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_08326
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle LLM Advertisement based on Neuron Auctions
Yun, Peiran
Xu, Wenxin
Liu, Jiayuan
Zhang, Yihang
Zeng, Liang
Kong, Lingkai
Wang, Tonghan
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coherence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous mechanism design intractable. To bridge this gap, we introduce Neuron Auctions, a novel paradigm that shifts the auction object from the surface text space to the LLM's internal representations. Leveraging mechanistic interpretability, we identify brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neurons and demonstrate that competing brands activate within approximately orthogonal subspaces. This near-perfect independence allows us to define continuous, disentangled intervention budgets (specifically, neuron counts and amplification factors) as auctionable commodities. Building on this computational carrier, we design a continuous menu-based auction mechanism that naturally guarantees strategy-proofness and optimizes revenue for the platform. By explicitly incorporating a user utility penalty into the platform's optimization objective, our framework dynamically prices out overly aggressive interventions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Neuron Auctions effectively preserve natural discourse quality while achieving an optimal alignment between commercial incentives and user satisfaction.
title LLM Advertisement based on Neuron Auctions
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.08326