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Mechanism Design Is Not Enough: Prosocial Agents for Cooperative AI

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Huang, Xuanqiang Angelo, Tharas, Charlie, Marro, Samuele, Truong, Van Q., Schölkopf, Bernhard, La Malfa, Emanuele, Jin, Zhijing
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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