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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.09217 |
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Table of Contents:
- For AI systems to be useful to humans, they must understand and act in accordance with our values and preferences. Since specifying preferences is a hard task, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to develop methods that allow for inferring preferences from observed behavior. However, IRL assumes the human to be approximately optimal. This is a big limitation in cases where the human themselves may be learning to act optimally in an environment. In this paper, we formalize the problem of learning the preferences of a learning agent: a predictor observes a learner acting online and tries to infer the underlying reward function being (initially suboptimally) optimized by the learner. We model the learner as either being no-regret, or as converging to an optimal Boltzmann policy over time. In each of these settings, we establish theoretical guarantees for various preference learning algorithms, or otherwise show that such guarantees are impossible.