Learning to Bid with Unknown Private Values in Budget-Constrained First-Price Auctions
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911667751747584 |
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| author | Hu, Zihao Wen, Yuxiao Yao, Yuan Zhang, Jiheng Zhou, Zhengyuan |
| author_facet | Hu, Zihao Wen, Yuxiao Yao, Yuan Zhang, Jiheng Zhou, Zhengyuan |
| contents | The transition to First-Price Auctions (FPA) in digital advertising has spurred significant research, yet existing work typically assumes access to a valuation oracle, ignoring the reality that values must be inferred from censored data. While Linear Treatment Effect (LTE) models address this by learning value uplift, they have not been adapted to realistic settings with hard Budget constraints or Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets requiring regret and violation control. In this work, we propose a unified primal-dual framework for constrained FPAs that jointly learns the latent LTE valuation parameters and the competitor's bid distribution. This simultaneous learning introduces a critical technical challenge: the estimation error is dynamically scaled by the Lagrangian multiplier, potentially leading to unbounded regret. We resolve this by leveraging a strong Slater condition and a novel adaptive burn-in procedure to stabilize the dual variables. Our approach achieves near-optimal regret guarantees, providing the first theoretically grounded solution for constrained bidding with latent valuations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_09448 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Learning to Bid with Unknown Private Values in Budget-Constrained First-Price Auctions Hu, Zihao Wen, Yuxiao Yao, Yuan Zhang, Jiheng Zhou, Zhengyuan Machine Learning The transition to First-Price Auctions (FPA) in digital advertising has spurred significant research, yet existing work typically assumes access to a valuation oracle, ignoring the reality that values must be inferred from censored data. While Linear Treatment Effect (LTE) models address this by learning value uplift, they have not been adapted to realistic settings with hard Budget constraints or Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets requiring regret and violation control. In this work, we propose a unified primal-dual framework for constrained FPAs that jointly learns the latent LTE valuation parameters and the competitor's bid distribution. This simultaneous learning introduces a critical technical challenge: the estimation error is dynamically scaled by the Lagrangian multiplier, potentially leading to unbounded regret. We resolve this by leveraging a strong Slater condition and a novel adaptive burn-in procedure to stabilize the dual variables. Our approach achieves near-optimal regret guarantees, providing the first theoretically grounded solution for constrained bidding with latent valuations. |
| title | Learning to Bid with Unknown Private Values in Budget-Constrained First-Price Auctions |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.09448 |