Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Kuvalekar, Aditya
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866916011309006848
author Kuvalekar, Aditya
author_facet Kuvalekar, Aditya
contents I study a decentralized marriage market with search frictions, costly pre-marital skill investments, and non-transferable utility. Despite a symmetric environment, the market can exhibit asymmetric equilibria, with one gender investing more in skills than the other; in some environments, the asymmetric equilibrium is unique. A microfounded model of household utility maximization shows that this transition from a unique symmetric equilibrium to a unique asymmetric equilibrium can be driven by rising labor-market wages for high-skilled workers: as the skill premium rises, one gender ends up fully investing while the other invests substantially less.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_10060
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets
Kuvalekar, Aditya
General Economics
Economics
I study a decentralized marriage market with search frictions, costly pre-marital skill investments, and non-transferable utility. Despite a symmetric environment, the market can exhibit asymmetric equilibria, with one gender investing more in skills than the other; in some environments, the asymmetric equilibrium is unique. A microfounded model of household utility maximization shows that this transition from a unique symmetric equilibrium to a unique asymmetric equilibrium can be driven by rising labor-market wages for high-skilled workers: as the skill premium rises, one gender ends up fully investing while the other invests substantially less.
title Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.10060