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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11356 |
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| _version_ | 1866918495935004672 |
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| author | Tavakoli, Hassan Nguyen, Thinh Bose, Bella |
| author_facet | Tavakoli, Hassan Nguyen, Thinh Bose, Bella |
| contents | We introduce \textbf{RankGuard-Polar}, a framework for safely publishing a subset of polar codeword coordinates over shared public resources. We assume a strong eavesdropper who has access to the channel input, i.e., the transmitted codeword coordinates published on a public resource access model. Working over \(\mathbb F_2\) and focusing on time-shared public/private BEC uses, we show that leakage from a published index set \(\mathbf{P}\) admits an exact algebraic characterization comes from an information-theoretic viewpoint, and we construct an explicit linear extractor ($R$) that identifies the leaked linear combinations. Building on this identity, we (i) give efficient procedures to compute and certify leakage for any \(\mathbf{P}\), (ii) propose a practical fast algorithm with provable efficiency. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_11356 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | RankGuardPolar Private Public Finite Length Polar Codes with Rank-Certified Leakage Tavakoli, Hassan Nguyen, Thinh Bose, Bella Information Theory We introduce \textbf{RankGuard-Polar}, a framework for safely publishing a subset of polar codeword coordinates over shared public resources. We assume a strong eavesdropper who has access to the channel input, i.e., the transmitted codeword coordinates published on a public resource access model. Working over \(\mathbb F_2\) and focusing on time-shared public/private BEC uses, we show that leakage from a published index set \(\mathbf{P}\) admits an exact algebraic characterization comes from an information-theoretic viewpoint, and we construct an explicit linear extractor ($R$) that identifies the leaked linear combinations. Building on this identity, we (i) give efficient procedures to compute and certify leakage for any \(\mathbf{P}\), (ii) propose a practical fast algorithm with provable efficiency. |
| title | RankGuardPolar Private Public Finite Length Polar Codes with Rank-Certified Leakage |
| topic | Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11356 |