Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11492 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914562456944640 |
|---|---|
| author | Corbino, Johnny |
| author_facet | Corbino, Johnny |
| contents | Adversarial attacks fool deep image classifiers by adding tiny, almost invisible noise patterns to a clean image. The standard $\ell^\infty$-bounded attacks (FGSM, PGD, and the $\ell^\infty$ variant of Carlini--Wagner) produce high-frequency, near-random sign patterns at the pixel level: nearly invisible in $\ell^2$, but carrying disproportionate gradient energy. We exploit this with a single-shot, training-free detector using the high-order Corbino--Castillo mimetic operators from the open-source MOLE library. No retraining, no surrogate classifier, no access to the network under attack: the verdict is a property of the input alone, computed in $O(HW)$ time. We validate the detector on the standard \texttt{peppers} test image at the canonical $\ell^\infty$ budget $\varepsilon = 16/255$ and observe a clean-vs-adversarial separation that grows monotonically from $3.55\times$ at order $k=2$ to $4.62\times$ at $k=8$. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_11492 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Mimetic Detector for Adversarial Image Perturbations Corbino, Johnny Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Adversarial attacks fool deep image classifiers by adding tiny, almost invisible noise patterns to a clean image. The standard $\ell^\infty$-bounded attacks (FGSM, PGD, and the $\ell^\infty$ variant of Carlini--Wagner) produce high-frequency, near-random sign patterns at the pixel level: nearly invisible in $\ell^2$, but carrying disproportionate gradient energy. We exploit this with a single-shot, training-free detector using the high-order Corbino--Castillo mimetic operators from the open-source MOLE library. No retraining, no surrogate classifier, no access to the network under attack: the verdict is a property of the input alone, computed in $O(HW)$ time. We validate the detector on the standard \texttt{peppers} test image at the canonical $\ell^\infty$ budget $\varepsilon = 16/255$ and observe a clean-vs-adversarial separation that grows monotonically from $3.55\times$ at order $k=2$ to $4.62\times$ at $k=8$. |
| title | A Mimetic Detector for Adversarial Image Perturbations |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11492 |