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Bayesian Persuasion with a Risk-Conscious Receiver

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Chen, Yujing
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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