Precautionary Governance of Autonomous AI: Legal Personhood as Functional Instrument
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866918498240823296 |
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| author | Brensing, Karsten |
| author_facet | Brensing, Karsten |
| contents | Autonomous AI systems generate responsibility gaps: consequential actions that cannot be satisfactorily attributed to developers, operators, or users under existing legal frameworks. The prevailing subject-object dichotomy fails to accommodate entities that exhibit autonomous, goal-directed behavior without recognized consciousness. Given irreducible epistemic uncertainty regarding artificial consciousness and the prospect of high-impact harms, the precautionary principle supports institutional design rather than regulatory inaction. This article advances limited legal personhood as a functional governance instrument for advanced AI systems. Drawing on organizational law, it proposes a two-tier corporate architecture in which AI systems operate through purpose-bound operating companies embedded within human-controlled holding structures, enabling transparency, accountability, and structural reversibility while remaining agnostic with respect to consciousness and moral status. The framework reflects a foundational reorientation toward future-oriented AI governance: where conventional approaches prioritize control and alignment, this article advances structured cooperation between human and artificial actors as the more sustainable institutional foundation. A pilot implementation using EU limited companies is currently under development, providing an initial test of doctrinal and operational feasibility. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_12505 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Precautionary Governance of Autonomous AI: Legal Personhood as Functional Instrument Brensing, Karsten Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence Autonomous AI systems generate responsibility gaps: consequential actions that cannot be satisfactorily attributed to developers, operators, or users under existing legal frameworks. The prevailing subject-object dichotomy fails to accommodate entities that exhibit autonomous, goal-directed behavior without recognized consciousness. Given irreducible epistemic uncertainty regarding artificial consciousness and the prospect of high-impact harms, the precautionary principle supports institutional design rather than regulatory inaction. This article advances limited legal personhood as a functional governance instrument for advanced AI systems. Drawing on organizational law, it proposes a two-tier corporate architecture in which AI systems operate through purpose-bound operating companies embedded within human-controlled holding structures, enabling transparency, accountability, and structural reversibility while remaining agnostic with respect to consciousness and moral status. The framework reflects a foundational reorientation toward future-oriented AI governance: where conventional approaches prioritize control and alignment, this article advances structured cooperation between human and artificial actors as the more sustainable institutional foundation. A pilot implementation using EU limited companies is currently under development, providing an initial test of doctrinal and operational feasibility. |
| title | Precautionary Governance of Autonomous AI: Legal Personhood as Functional Instrument |
| topic | Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12505 |