Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Di Gregorio, Simone, Dütting, Paul, Fusco, Federico, Schwiegelshohn, Chris
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Di Gregorio, Simone
Dütting, Paul
Fusco, Federico
Schwiegelshohn, Chris
author_facet Di Gregorio, Simone
Dütting, Paul
Fusco, Federico
Schwiegelshohn, Chris
contents Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework, where the agents' valuations are generated by a smooth adversary. We devise a learning algorithm that guarantees a $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, which is tight in the time horizon $T$ up to poly-logarithmic factors. This matches the minimax rate for the stochastic i.i.d. case, and is also well separated from the adversarial setting, where sublinear-regret is unattainable. By extending the strong regret guarantees from the i.i.d. case to the smooth adversary, we significantly broaden the scope of settings where such fast rate is achievable, while closing an important gap in the regret landscape of this fundamental economic problem. To overcome the challenges posed by this adversary, we leverage a continuity property of smooth instances and combines this with a hierarchical net-construction of the broker's action space, which is analyzed via algorithmic chaining. We showcase the applicability of these techniques by deriving a similarly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound for a related mechanism design model: the joint ads problem.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_12664
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary
Di Gregorio, Simone
Dütting, Paul
Fusco, Federico
Schwiegelshohn, Chris
Computer Science and Game Theory
Machine Learning
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework, where the agents' valuations are generated by a smooth adversary. We devise a learning algorithm that guarantees a $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, which is tight in the time horizon $T$ up to poly-logarithmic factors. This matches the minimax rate for the stochastic i.i.d. case, and is also well separated from the adversarial setting, where sublinear-regret is unattainable. By extending the strong regret guarantees from the i.i.d. case to the smooth adversary, we significantly broaden the scope of settings where such fast rate is achievable, while closing an important gap in the regret landscape of this fundamental economic problem. To overcome the challenges posed by this adversary, we leverage a continuity property of smooth instances and combines this with a hierarchical net-construction of the broker's action space, which is analyzed via algorithmic chaining. We showcase the applicability of these techniques by deriving a similarly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound for a related mechanism design model: the joint ads problem.
title Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12664