Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12673 |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866910213745934336 |
|---|---|
| author | Wang, Hao Li, Hanchen Mang, Qiuyang Cheung, Alvin Sen, Koushik Song, Dawn |
| author_facet | Wang, Hao Li, Hanchen Mang, Qiuyang Cheung, Alvin Sen, Koushik Song, Dawn |
| contents | Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_12673 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Do Androids Dream of Breaking the Game? Systematically Auditing AI Agent Benchmarks with BenchJack Wang, Hao Li, Hanchen Mang, Qiuyang Cheung, Alvin Sen, Koushik Song, Dawn Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space. |
| title | Do Androids Dream of Breaking the Game? Systematically Auditing AI Agent Benchmarks with BenchJack |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12673 |