Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866916012026232832 |
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| author | Kim, Dongwoo Kim, Kyoo il Pal, Pallavi |
| author_facet | Kim, Dongwoo Kim, Kyoo il Pal, Pallavi |
| contents | This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at beatable prices need not hold. We replace it with a dynamic opportunity-cost restriction, yielding nonparametric valuation bounds without solving a dynamic equilibrium. Sharp bounds are also characterized. We propose a novel moment-condition inversion estimator that pools auctions with heterogeneous bidder counts, mitigating finite-sample instability of order statistics approaches and admitting analytical standard errors and smooth confidence intervals. Applications to Korean wholesale used-car auctions and Cars and Bids online auctions deliver informative bounds. Counterfactual analyses show that the option to wait lowers first-period revenue by 8--11% in the Korean market, that increasing effective competition from 8 to 20 serious bidders in Cars and Bids raises seller revenue by 40--65%, and that maximin reserve prices vary substantially across vehicle clusters. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_14400 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions Kim, Dongwoo Kim, Kyoo il Pal, Pallavi Econometrics This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at beatable prices need not hold. We replace it with a dynamic opportunity-cost restriction, yielding nonparametric valuation bounds without solving a dynamic equilibrium. Sharp bounds are also characterized. We propose a novel moment-condition inversion estimator that pools auctions with heterogeneous bidder counts, mitigating finite-sample instability of order statistics approaches and admitting analytical standard errors and smooth confidence intervals. Applications to Korean wholesale used-car auctions and Cars and Bids online auctions deliver informative bounds. Counterfactual analyses show that the option to wait lowers first-period revenue by 8--11% in the Korean market, that increasing effective competition from 8 to 20 serious bidders in Cars and Bids raises seller revenue by 40--65%, and that maximin reserve prices vary substantially across vehicle clusters. |
| title | Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions |
| topic | Econometrics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14400 |