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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14509 |
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| _version_ | 1866918501181030400 |
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| author | Zhen, Hongwei Yu, Ze Xiang, Xin Sun, Mingyang Li, Wuhua |
| author_facet | Zhen, Hongwei Yu, Ze Xiang, Xin Sun, Mingyang Li, Wuhua |
| contents | The high penetration of voltage source converters in modern smart microgrids enhances operational flexibility while introducing complex cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Existing cyber-attack studies either require detailed knowledge of system topology and controller dynamics or depend on repeated online interactions, which may compromise practicality by generating operationally infeasible or limit-violating commands. This article investigates a dispatch command manipulation attack and develops an admittance-guided framework to identify the vulnerable inverter and the worst-case dispatch command that most severely degrades system stability. A compromised inverter is utilized to inject controlled harmonic perturbations for sparse admittance measurement, and a physics-informed neural network is then employed to reconstruct the operating-point-dependent admittance of target inverters over the feasible dispatch region. Based on the reconstructed admittance, a stability-margin-oriented optimization is formulated to locate the most vulnerable inverter and the corresponding worst-case dispatch command. Controller hardware-in-the-loop experiments on a five-inverter microgrid demonstrate that the identified command can drive the system into severe sub-synchronous oscillations while remaining within nominal dispatch bounds, highlighting the need for stability-aware command screening beyond static limit checking. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_14509 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Admittance-Guided Inverter Dispatch Command Manipulation Attack: A Grid Stability-Oriented Approach Zhen, Hongwei Yu, Ze Xiang, Xin Sun, Mingyang Li, Wuhua Systems and Control The high penetration of voltage source converters in modern smart microgrids enhances operational flexibility while introducing complex cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Existing cyber-attack studies either require detailed knowledge of system topology and controller dynamics or depend on repeated online interactions, which may compromise practicality by generating operationally infeasible or limit-violating commands. This article investigates a dispatch command manipulation attack and develops an admittance-guided framework to identify the vulnerable inverter and the worst-case dispatch command that most severely degrades system stability. A compromised inverter is utilized to inject controlled harmonic perturbations for sparse admittance measurement, and a physics-informed neural network is then employed to reconstruct the operating-point-dependent admittance of target inverters over the feasible dispatch region. Based on the reconstructed admittance, a stability-margin-oriented optimization is formulated to locate the most vulnerable inverter and the corresponding worst-case dispatch command. Controller hardware-in-the-loop experiments on a five-inverter microgrid demonstrate that the identified command can drive the system into severe sub-synchronous oscillations while remaining within nominal dispatch bounds, highlighting the need for stability-aware command screening beyond static limit checking. |
| title | Admittance-Guided Inverter Dispatch Command Manipulation Attack: A Grid Stability-Oriented Approach |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14509 |