Position: Behavioural Assurance Cannot Verify the Safety Claims Governance Now Demands

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Seth, Pratinav, Sankarapu, Vinay Kumar
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866914567688290304
author Seth, Pratinav
Sankarapu, Vinay Kumar
author_facet Seth, Pratinav
Sankarapu, Vinay Kumar
contents This position paper argues that behavioural assurance, even when carefully designed, is being asked to carry safety claims it cannot verify. AI governance frameworks enacted between 2019 and early 2026 require reviewable evidence of properties such as the absence of hidden objectives, resistance to loss-of-control precursors, and bounded catastrophic capability; current assurance methodologies (primarily behavioural evaluations and red-teaming) are epistemically limited to observable model outputs and cannot verify the latent representations or long-horizon agentic behaviours these frameworks presume to regulate. We formalize this structural mismatch as the audit gap, the divergence between required and achievable verification access, and introduce the concept of fragile assurance to describe cases where the evidential structure does not support the asserted safety claim. Through an analysis of a 21-instrument inventory, we identify an incentive gradient where geopolitical and industrial pressures systematically reward surface-level behavioral proxies over deep structural verification. Finally, we propose a technical pivot: bounding the weight of behavioral evidence in legal text and extending voluntary pre-deployment access with mechanistic-evidence classes, specifically linear probes, activation patching, and before/after-training comparisons.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_15164
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Position: Behavioural Assurance Cannot Verify the Safety Claims Governance Now Demands
Seth, Pratinav
Sankarapu, Vinay Kumar
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
This position paper argues that behavioural assurance, even when carefully designed, is being asked to carry safety claims it cannot verify. AI governance frameworks enacted between 2019 and early 2026 require reviewable evidence of properties such as the absence of hidden objectives, resistance to loss-of-control precursors, and bounded catastrophic capability; current assurance methodologies (primarily behavioural evaluations and red-teaming) are epistemically limited to observable model outputs and cannot verify the latent representations or long-horizon agentic behaviours these frameworks presume to regulate. We formalize this structural mismatch as the audit gap, the divergence between required and achievable verification access, and introduce the concept of fragile assurance to describe cases where the evidential structure does not support the asserted safety claim. Through an analysis of a 21-instrument inventory, we identify an incentive gradient where geopolitical and industrial pressures systematically reward surface-level behavioral proxies over deep structural verification. Finally, we propose a technical pivot: bounding the weight of behavioral evidence in legal text and extending voluntary pre-deployment access with mechanistic-evidence classes, specifically linear probes, activation patching, and before/after-training comparisons.
title Position: Behavioural Assurance Cannot Verify the Safety Claims Governance Now Demands
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15164