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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15786 |
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| _version_ | 1866913132069257216 |
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| author | Surugue, Henri Destercke, Sébastien |
| author_facet | Surugue, Henri Destercke, Sébastien |
| contents | We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take strategic decisions. Focusing on belief functions in particular, we demonstrate that this very expressive model includes in one sweep many existing models based on probabilities, sets or incomplete preferences. Additionally, we generalize several well-known convergence results from the literature to this broader representational setting. Furthermore, we illustrate how this model can capture more realistic scenarios for practical applications but also raises theoretical challenges. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_15786 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An Enriched Model of Strategic Voting under Uncertainty Surugue, Henri Destercke, Sébastien Computer Science and Game Theory We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take strategic decisions. Focusing on belief functions in particular, we demonstrate that this very expressive model includes in one sweep many existing models based on probabilities, sets or incomplete preferences. Additionally, we generalize several well-known convergence results from the literature to this broader representational setting. Furthermore, we illustrate how this model can capture more realistic scenarios for practical applications but also raises theoretical challenges. |
| title | An Enriched Model of Strategic Voting under Uncertainty |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15786 |