FedEDAuth -- Federated Embedding Distribution Authentication for Counterfeit IC Detection
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913132156289024 |
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| author | Lodge, Naseeruddin Aklekar, Dhruva Chadalavada, Vineet Tambe, Nahush Gholami, Sina Alam, Minhaj Saqib, Fareena |
| author_facet | Lodge, Naseeruddin Aklekar, Dhruva Chadalavada, Vineet Tambe, Nahush Gholami, Sina Alam, Minhaj Saqib, Fareena |
| contents | The widespread of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) poses severe risks to the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of modern electronic systems. Federated learning (FL) offers a privacy-preserving paradigm for collaborative counterfeit detection across the semiconductor supply chain, but its vulnerability to byzantine data poisoning attacks limits practical deployment. This paper presents Federated Embedding Distribution Authentication (FedEDAuth), a lightweight, embedding level client authentication framework that detects and filters malicious participants before model aggregation. FedEDAuth leverages reference embedding distributions derived from a golden dataset and evaluates clients using outlier analysis, mean shift measurements, and micro-cluster behavior without requiring access to raw data or gradients. Integrated into standard FL pipelines, FedEDAuth consistently identifies all poisoned clients in experimental settings with 50 distributed participants under the byzantine data poisoning attack, achieving a 100% malicious client detection rate. After filtering, the federated model achieved a high counterfeit IC classification performance of 94.17% accuracy. These results not only validate FedEDAuth's effectiveness but also underscore the broader potential of secure, trustworthy FL frameworks as a critical advancement for next generation hardware security solutions, enabling robust, collaborative intelligence across the semiconductor supply chain. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_15885 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | FedEDAuth -- Federated Embedding Distribution Authentication for Counterfeit IC Detection Lodge, Naseeruddin Aklekar, Dhruva Chadalavada, Vineet Tambe, Nahush Gholami, Sina Alam, Minhaj Saqib, Fareena Cryptography and Security The widespread of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) poses severe risks to the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of modern electronic systems. Federated learning (FL) offers a privacy-preserving paradigm for collaborative counterfeit detection across the semiconductor supply chain, but its vulnerability to byzantine data poisoning attacks limits practical deployment. This paper presents Federated Embedding Distribution Authentication (FedEDAuth), a lightweight, embedding level client authentication framework that detects and filters malicious participants before model aggregation. FedEDAuth leverages reference embedding distributions derived from a golden dataset and evaluates clients using outlier analysis, mean shift measurements, and micro-cluster behavior without requiring access to raw data or gradients. Integrated into standard FL pipelines, FedEDAuth consistently identifies all poisoned clients in experimental settings with 50 distributed participants under the byzantine data poisoning attack, achieving a 100% malicious client detection rate. After filtering, the federated model achieved a high counterfeit IC classification performance of 94.17% accuracy. These results not only validate FedEDAuth's effectiveness but also underscore the broader potential of secure, trustworthy FL frameworks as a critical advancement for next generation hardware security solutions, enabling robust, collaborative intelligence across the semiconductor supply chain. |
| title | FedEDAuth -- Federated Embedding Distribution Authentication for Counterfeit IC Detection |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15885 |