Cover Image

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk, van Ryzin, Garrett, Li, Jiaxuan
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2026)

Robust pricing for cloud computing
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2025)

Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2025)

Menu Pricing of Large Language Models
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2025)

Screening with Persuasion
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2022)

Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2024)

A Strategic Topology on Information Structures
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2024)

Designing Simple Mechanisms
by: Li, Shengwu
Published: (2024)

Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
by: Giordano, Francesco
Published: (2026)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
by: Doval, Laura, et al.
Published: (2025)

Risk Propagation in Endogenous Supply Chains
by: Titton, Andrea
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design by a Politician
by: Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
by: Häfner, Samuel, et al.
Published: (2025)

Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
by: Balzer, Benjamin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)

Optimal Pricing of Cloud Services: Committed Spend under Demand Uncertainty
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2025)

Partition-form Cooperative Games in Two-Echelon Supply Chains
by: Wadhwa, Gurkirat, et al.
Published: (2024)

Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
by: Yan, Eric
Published: (2024)

Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers: A Queueing Theory Approach
by: Li, Zihao, et al.
Published: (2026)

How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)

Game Theory Analysis of Third-Party Regulation in Organic Supply Chains
by: Zambujal-Oliveira, Joao, et al.
Published: (2025)

Allocating Positional Goods: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Xiao, Peiran
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle
by: Xiong, Siyang
Published: (2024)

Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
by: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Published: (2023)

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
by: Anunrojwong, Jerry, et al.
Published: (2022)

Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Dimitrov, Dinko, et al.
Published: (2025)

Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives
by: Augias, Victor, et al.
Published: (2023)

Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2024)

Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer via Automated Mechanism Design
by: Hashimoto, Kento, et al.
Published: (2025)

Self-Confirming Mechanisms
by: Feng, Zhiming, et al.
Published: (2026)

Power and Freedom in Mechanisms
by: Basteck, Christian, et al.
Published: (2025)

Complete Exchange Mechanisms
by: Kitahara, Minoru, et al.
Published: (2025)

Visibly Fair Mechanisms
by: Bó, Inácio, et al.
Published: (2025)

Local Priority Mechanisms
by: Root, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2023)

Contextually Private Mechanisms
by: Haupt, Andreas, et al.
Published: (2021)

Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
by: Feffer, Joseph, et al.
Published: (2026)

Statistical Mechanism Design: Robust Pricing, Estimation, and Inference
by: Gonçalves, Duarte, et al.
Published: (2024)

Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange
by: Manjunath, Vikram, et al.
Published: (2025)

Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
by: Che, Yeon-Koo, et al.
Published: (2025)

Lexicographic Robustness and the Efficiency of Optimal Mechanisms
by: Kambhampati, Ashwin
Published: (2026)