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Autori principali: Zhang, Qian, Zhao, Sadie, Diao, Lucy, Byers, Conleigh, Chen, Yiling, Cansever, Derya, Xie, Le
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16794
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author Zhang, Qian
Zhao, Sadie
Diao, Lucy
Byers, Conleigh
Chen, Yiling
Cansever, Derya
Xie, Le
author_facet Zhang, Qian
Zhao, Sadie
Diao, Lucy
Byers, Conleigh
Chen, Yiling
Cansever, Derya
Xie, Le
contents Coincident Peak (CP) pricing is widely used in U.S. electricity markets to allocate capacity and transmission costs. This paper develops a behavioral game-theoretic framework for CP-driven load shifting that couples a nonlinear cost-allocation model with day-ahead (one-shot) and real-time (sequential-learning) decision processes. We examine two update rules, namely best-response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious-play dynamics (FPD), across continuous and finite action spaces to quantify how flexibility, action resolution, and participation influence peak outcomes. Using ERCOT peak-day data, we find that FPD reliably reduces system peaks, whereas BRD is more variable and can increase peaks under tight-capacity conditions. Finer action resolution improves peak shaving, while the number of participants is largely neutral when aggregate flexibility is fixed. Meanwhile, information-provider signals can induce herding, whereas response-aware or diverse signals improve peak shaving. These results highlight both the potential and limits of CP pricing: smoothing information and enabling granular control are as important as the amount of available flexibility. The framework offers practical guidance for system operators and consumers: For ISOs, broadcasting smoothed CP signals and setting minimum controllable-capacity thresholds enhance coordination. For consumers, greater flexibility and finer control resolution improve both cost savings and peak-shaving performance.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_16794
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Modeling Coincident Peak Pricing in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Peak Shaving Effectiveness
Zhang, Qian
Zhao, Sadie
Diao, Lucy
Byers, Conleigh
Chen, Yiling
Cansever, Derya
Xie, Le
Systems and Control
Coincident Peak (CP) pricing is widely used in U.S. electricity markets to allocate capacity and transmission costs. This paper develops a behavioral game-theoretic framework for CP-driven load shifting that couples a nonlinear cost-allocation model with day-ahead (one-shot) and real-time (sequential-learning) decision processes. We examine two update rules, namely best-response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious-play dynamics (FPD), across continuous and finite action spaces to quantify how flexibility, action resolution, and participation influence peak outcomes. Using ERCOT peak-day data, we find that FPD reliably reduces system peaks, whereas BRD is more variable and can increase peaks under tight-capacity conditions. Finer action resolution improves peak shaving, while the number of participants is largely neutral when aggregate flexibility is fixed. Meanwhile, information-provider signals can induce herding, whereas response-aware or diverse signals improve peak shaving. These results highlight both the potential and limits of CP pricing: smoothing information and enabling granular control are as important as the amount of available flexibility. The framework offers practical guidance for system operators and consumers: For ISOs, broadcasting smoothed CP signals and setting minimum controllable-capacity thresholds enhance coordination. For consumers, greater flexibility and finer control resolution improve both cost savings and peak-shaving performance.
title Modeling Coincident Peak Pricing in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Peak Shaving Effectiveness
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.16794