Imagen de Portada

A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Wu, Jun, Huang, Jian, Wang, Chongjun
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
por: Shan, Liang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

On the Efficiency of Fair and Truthful Trade Mechanisms
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division
por: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation
por: Freeman, Rupert, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond
por: Tao, Biaoshuai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms
por: de Berg, Mark, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Preference-Based Learning via the VCG Mechanism
por: Landolt, Leo, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Toward Resilient Airdrop Mechanisms: Empirical Measurement of Hunter Profits and Airdrop Game Theory Modeling
por: Luo, Junliang, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness
por: Bu, Xiaolin, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?
por: Li, Bo, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
por: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Beyond Game Theory Optimal: Profit-Maximizing Poker Agents for No-Limit Holdem
por: Yi, SeungHyun, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Truthful Interval Covering
por: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Optimal Mediation Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

A Participatory Budgeting based Truthful Budget-Limited Incentive Mechanism for Time-Constrained Tasks in Crowdsensing Systems
por: Bhargavi, Chattu, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truthful High Dimensional Sparse Linear Regression
por: Zhu, Liyang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

On Robustness to $k$-wise Independence of Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms
por: Gravin, Nick, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting
por: Han, Qishen, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Calibration without Ground Truth
por: Kong, Yuqing, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Online Learning in Betting Markets: Profit versus Prediction
por: Zhu, Haiqing, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Hallucinating Flows for Optimal Mechanisms
por: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Balancing Profit and Traveller Acceptance in Ride-Pooling Personalised Fares
por: Bujak, Michal, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism with Signaling
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truthful Fair Division under Stochastic Valuations
por: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location
por: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Asymptotically Fair and Truthful Allocation of Public Goods
por: Kananian, Pouya, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games
por: Deligkas, Argyrios, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Fair and Truthful Allocations Under Leveled Valuations
por: Christodoulou, George, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations
por: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization
por: Ma, Yunxuan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers
por: Lucier, Brendan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Plant-and-Steal: Truthful Fair Allocations via Predictions
por: Cohen, Ilan Reuven, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Truthful Facility Location with Candidate Locations and Limited Resources
por: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

All-pay Auction Based Profit Maximization in End-to-End Computation Offloading System
por: Xue, Hai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
por: Liaw, Christopher, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences
por: Hirvonen, Juho, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences
por: Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Incentivizing Truthful Data Contributions in a Marketplace for Mean Estimation
por: Chen, Keran, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Truthful, Credible, and Optimal Auctions for Matroids via Blockchains and Commitments
por: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)