The fragility of reputation effects
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866913135943745536 |
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| author | Vong, Allen |
| author_facet | Vong, Allen |
| contents | I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by allowing short-lived players to be uncertain not only about the long-lived player's type, but also about the signal structure. I show that even vanishingly small misspecified skepticism of short-lived players about commitment as an explanation of the observed signals can completely eliminate reputation effects: a patient strategic long-lived player's equilibrium payoff is bounded above by the canonical complete-information benchmark. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2605_17090 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The fragility of reputation effects Vong, Allen Theoretical Economics I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by allowing short-lived players to be uncertain not only about the long-lived player's type, but also about the signal structure. I show that even vanishingly small misspecified skepticism of short-lived players about commitment as an explanation of the observed signals can completely eliminate reputation effects: a patient strategic long-lived player's equilibrium payoff is bounded above by the canonical complete-information benchmark. |
| title | The fragility of reputation effects |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.17090 |